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ABSTRACT 
We propose a novel agent-based implementation of Festingers’ Social Comparison Theo-
ry (SCT). The Social Comparison Model (SCM) consists of connectionist networks that 
simulate agent-level social comparison processes. Agent networks are combined into a 
adaptive network structure that is shaped by social comparisons between individual 
agents. Simulations show how the SCM produces behavior consistent with the empirical 
literature on group dynamics. In addition, experimental results are reported that show 
how the SCM can simulate how critical and conformist norms affect interpersonal pro-
cesses and emergent attitudes. We conclude that the coupling of simulations and experi-
ments, and the use of psychologically plausible agent models within adaptive network 
structures, can provide new impetus to the development of models of individual and so-
cial cognition. An integrated framework such as the SCM allows investigating key theo-
retical predictions around the origin and maintenance of socially shared information 
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1. Introduction 
An extensive literature in social psychology and sociology has established that shared 
norms emerge from interpersonal interactions, during which individuals reduce uncer-
tainty and conflict by adapting their individual attitudes and opinions. Two key figures in 
this research are Sherif (Sherif, 1935) and Festinger (Festinger, 1954). Sherif demonstrat-
ed empirically how small groups of individuals tend to develop shared norms about the 
features of ambiguous phenomena. These studies inspired Festinger to develop a theory 
of norm formation, which lead to the development of Social Comparison Theory (SCT). 
The theory postulates that individuals constantly compare their opinions, attitudes and 
believes to those of others. These social comparisons are seen as a pervasive feature of 
social interaction, and central to the understanding of how groups develop socially vali-
dated information. Social comparison theory thus provides a theoretical account of how 
interpersonal interactions produce shared attitudes and consensus. 
 
In this paper, we introduce a multi-agent model based on SCT. We take from the theory 
the guiding principle behind our model, which is that people judge the appropriateness of 
their behaviors or opinions by comparing them to those of other people around them. We 
will illustrate how a computational model can aid in the further development of social 
comparison theory by taking into account both individual-level psychological processes 
and interpersonal processes.  First, we start by briefly describing social comparison theo-
ry. We then introduce the model, and illustrate how the implementation of SCT agent 
principles produces social group behavior that is consistent with empirical findings. We 
then present the results of an experiment in which a number of key hypotheses of the 
model were tested. We conclude by comparing the model to other simulation work, and 
by discussing future directions for research. 
2.	  Social	  comparison	  theory	  
Social comparison theory is one of the earliest and most influential theories of how so-
cially shared knowledge is developed and maintained through social interaction 
(Festinger, 1954).  It has been widely acknowledged that the process of social compari-
son is a central feature of human social life (Goethals & Darley, 1977), and it has been 
shown to underlie, for instance, the phenomenon of group polarization (Axelrod, 1997). 
It has even been argued that the need to compare the self with others has evolved in other 
species as well, as an general adaptive mechanism for sizing up one’s competitors 
(Gilbert, Price, & Allan, 1995). 
The main principle behind the original theory is that people use social reality - in the 
form of opinions, behavior and beliefs of other people around them - to judge the appro-
priateness of their own behaviors or opinions, and this particularly when physical reality 
fails to provide sufficient cues.  Probably the most well known example of this is the 
work by Sherif (1935) on the development of social norms. Using the auto-kinetic effect 
(perceived motion of a stationary light in a dark room), Sherif showed that participants’ 
judgments about how far a light had moved, converged over time. Although very simple, 
his experiments illustrate a key axiom of SCT - People tend to assimilate: “The drive for 
self evaluation is a force acting on persons to belong to groups, to associate with others. 
People, then, tend to move into groups which, in their judgment, hold opinions which 
agree with their own” (Festinger, 1954). And “The existence of a discrepancy in a group 
with respect to opinions or abilities will lead to action on the part of members of that 
group to reduce the discrepancy” (Festinger, 1954). These behavioral principles lead to 
the development of homogeneous groups, like in the Sherif experiment – groups that or-
ganize around a shared norm.  
Subsequent research established that the tendency to assimilate decreases as the dif-
ference between opinions increases. In fact, when the difference exceeds a certain thresh-
old, individuals will strive to further distinguish themselves from others - this is referred 
to as contrast. A variety of socio-cognitive factors have been shown to affect the position 
of the threshold at which a drive towards assimilation is replaced with one towards con-
trast, from motivational factors (i.e. norms) to factors related to personal and social iden-
tity processes (for an overview, see Mussweiler, 2003).  
 
Social comparison theory can potentially provide a parsimonious theoretical framework 
to study the socio-cognitive processes through which shared information is produced and 
maintained in social groups. However, many aspects of the theory are couched in ambig-
uous verbal descriptions. This, in combination with the inherent complexity of group 
dynamics, has made it difficult to directly test the predicted impact of repeated, individu-
al social comparisons in groups, and particularly how they contribute to group dynamics 
and the validation of shared information. We will now describe a connectionist, agent-
based model that aims to overcome this, by providing an algorithmic implementation of 
the key principles underlying social comparison theory.  
 
3. The multi-agent system 
Agent-based models (ABM) build social structures from the “bottom-up”, by simulating 
individuals with virtual agents and stipulating rules that govern interactions among these 
agents. They express in clear mathematical and computational terms, how complex social 
structures emerge from interactions of individual agents at various distinct levels, allow-
ing the analysis of properties of individual agents (e.g. their attributes and interactions), 
and emergent group-level behavior.  However, human social groups change not only 
through structural adaptations (i.e. social organization), but also by guiding and restruc-
turing the behaviors and cognitions of the individuals that form them.  To that extent, 
several modelers (Resnick, 1994; Sallach, 2003) have argued that ABM need to incorpo-
rate relatively sophisticated models of individual agents, to allow them to adapt and 
change their behavior over time.   
 
In this paper, an ABM is introduced that aims at accomplishing this by implementing 
social comparison processes in a connectionist agent model.  Connectionism is an ap-
proach in the fields of artificial intelligence, psychology, neuroscience and philosophy of 
mind, that models mental and behavioral phenomena as the emergent processes of inter-
connected networks of simple units. Connectionist architectures and processing mecha-
nisms are based on analogies with properties of the human brain, in which learning is 
conceptualized as a process of on-line adaptation of existing knowledge to novel infor-
mation provided by the environment. The focus in this paper will be on the recurrent au-
to-associator (McClelland & Rumelhart, 1988; McClelland & Rumelhart, 1985), a model 
that has been applied successfully to group biases, causal attribution, person and group 
impression in social psychology (Smith & Conrey, 2007; Smith & DeCoster, 1998; Van 
Rooy, Van Overwalle, Vanhoomissen, Labiouse, & French, 2003).  
3.1	  Agents	  
The recurrent network used to simulate an agent has three distinctive features (see Figure 
1).  First, all units within an individual agent network are interconnected, such that all 
units send out and receive activation.  Second, an agents’ state is represented as levels of 
activation of its units. Information arriving at an agent is represented by external activa-
tion of its units. This is automatically spread among the interconnected units within an 
agent in proportion to the weights of their connections, resulting in an internal activation. 
These are summed to give the net activation, which reflects the short-term memory of the 
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network. The third distinctive feature is that short-term activations are stored in long-term 
changes in the strength (weight) of the connections. Typically, activations and weights 
have lower and upper bounds of approximately –1 and +1. 
 
Insert Figure 1: Recurrent agent network 
 
In a recurrent network, processing information takes place in two phases. During the first 
phase, the activation of each unit in the network is determined. Each unit receives a stim-
ulus from external sources, termed exti, which generates an external activation ext_ai in 





This activation subsequently spreads through the auto-associative network, meaning eve-
ry unit i receives internal activation int_ai, which is the sum of the activation from the 
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The updating of activation at each cycle is governed by the following equation: 
   
(4) 
 
where D reflects a memory decay term. As in previous simulations (D. Van Rooy et al., 
2003), parameter values were set to D = E = 1. Hence, the final activation of a unit 
equals the sum of the external and internal activation, or 
 
 (5) 
      
After activation has been determined, the recurrent model enters the second, learning 
phase in which the short-term activations are stored in long-term weight changes of the 
connections. Basically, these weight changes are driven by the difference between the 
internal activation received from other units in an agents network, and the external acti-
vation received from outside sources. This difference, also called the error, is reduced in 
proportion to the learning rate that determines how fast the network changes its weights 
and learns. This error-reducing mechanism is known as the delta algorithm (McClelland 
& Rumelhart, 1988; McClelland & Rumelhart, 1985).  In mathematical terms, the delta 
algorithm strives to match the internal predictions of the network int_ai as closely as pos-
sible to the actual state of the external environment ext_ai and stores this information in 




where ∆wji is the change in the weight of the connection from unit j to i, and ε is a learn-
ing rate that determines how fast the network learns ( McClelland & Rumelhart, 1985). 
An implication of this learning algorithm is that when an object and its features co-occur 
frequently, then their connection weight gradually increases to eventually reach an as-
ymptotic value of +1.  
 
net_ai =  E  ×  ext_ai +  int_ai( )
 ai =  net_ai +  1 –  D( )× ai−previous
ai =  net_ai =  ext_ai +  int_ai
Δwji =  ε  × ext_ai −  int_ai( )  ×  aj
ext_ai =  E  ×  exti
3.2.	  Interaction	  
A number of authors have illustrated how auto-associative networks can be naturally ex-
tended to allow interaction or communication between them (Hazlehurst & Hutchins, 
1998).  It basically involves creating an agent-based model such that individual recurrent 
networks or agents are linked in an adaptive network structure.  Any agent can (in princi-
ple) interact with any other agent, but the impact of the interaction will adapt to experi-
ence (Hazlehurst & Hutchins, 1998; Van Overwalle & Heylighen, 2006).  In the current 
simulation, communication involves the transmission of information from one agent net-
work to another, along connections whose adaptive weights reflect the mutual social in-
fluence between agents. During a simulated interaction, receiving agents compare their 
information (as represented by internal activation of their own network) with the infor-
mation from sending agents (represented by the external activation received from sending 
agents). Consistent with the social comparison framework, we will refer to the receiving 
agent as the Comparer, and the sending agent as the Target (see Figure 2). The comparer 
agent c sums all information on each issue i from all other target agents t in proportion to 
the inter-agent weights, and then processes this information internally (according to the 




where ext_aci represents the external activation received by comparer agent c on feature i; 
wtiàci is the inter-agent weight from Target agent i to the Comparer agent c; and ati de-
notes the final activation (which combines the external and internal activation received) 
expressed by the Target agent t. 
 
 
INSERT Figure 2: Interaction between Comparer and Target agent. 
3.3	  Social	  comparison	  process	  
A number of Festingers’ axioms were implemented directly into the agent model 
(Festinger, 1954; Fridman & Kaminka, 2011). The first principle is that agents compare 
their state to that of other agents. Second, when a communicated position falls within an 
agent’s latitude of acceptance, an agent will strive to reduce the social difference with the 
object of comparison (assimilation). As pointed out earlier, research has also shown that, 
under many circumstances, individuals that disagree on a particular issue, or have very 
different attitudes, will seek to distance themselves.  This is reflected in the third princi-
ple: When a communicated position falls outside an agent’s latitude of acceptance, an 
agent will strive to increase the social difference with the object of comparison (con-
trast). 
These principles can be implemented as natural extensions of the connectionist 
framework introduced above. Any social comparison process involves a Comparing and 
Target agent. The TargetàComparer weights are updated driven by the error between the 
external information provided by the Target, representing the attitude of the Target on a 
particular feature i, and the internal activation of the Comparer, representing the attitude 




where ext_aci is the final activation send out by the Target to the Comparer agent, and 
int_aci is the internal activation generated by the Comparer agent.  When the discrepancy 
between these 2 values falls within the Comparer agent’s latitude of acceptance, the agent 
will strive to reduce the social difference with the Target (assimilation).  When it exceeds 
this threshold, the Comparer will strive to increase the social difference with the Target 
(contrast). This is expressed mathematically as: 
 
 
δ i =  ext _aci  –  int_aci
ext _aci = wti→ci *ati
j
∑




then ∆ wti→ci  =  η  ×  (1-wti→ci ) ×  | ati |  [Assimilation]
else  ∆ wti→ci  =  η  ×  (0 -wti→ci ) ×  | ati |  [Contrast]
 
 
where η is the rate by which the weights are adjusted,  and |ati| is the absolute value of the 
activation on issue i by the Target agent t.  Formula 9 describes the corrective action of 
the comparing agent on the selected feature. If the discrepancy falls within the latitude 
threshold, this action involves assimilation, otherwise contrast.  
This constitutes an adaptive social process, in which agents learn from interacting 
with each other: Agents that consistently express attitudes that fall within each other’s 
latitude, will gradually develop stronger mutual links.  The social experience acquired in 
this way is represented in a distributed manner, in patterns of weighted links across the 
whole network. In combination with formula 7, this means that agents that share similar 
attitudes consistently will gradually have greater influence on each other. As such, a 
group of agents functions as an adaptive network in which information and knowledge 
are distributed among and propagated in function of the social influence between differ-
ent individual networks.   
4. Model hypotheses 
The use of a connectionist agent model is one of the features that distinguishes the cur-
rent approach from previous ABM. The connectionist learning and  processing algo-
rithms underlying the agent model are based on analogies with properties of the human 
brain  (Van Rooy et al. 2003; Smith & DeCoster, 1998), and simulate learning as a pro-
cess of online adaptation of existing knowledge to novel information provided by the 
environment. As such, the agent model provides a degree of psychological plausibility 
that is often missing from previous ABM. 
In the following simulations, we will explore the basic dynamics of the model in 
terms of agent learning and social interaction. We will use a very simple design, based on 
classic group perception experiments that have received both extensive modeling ( Van 
Rooy et al., 2003) and empirical attention (Van Rooy, Vanhoomissen, & Van Overwalle, 
2013). Remarkably, most of this literature has focused almost entirely on the individual 
process of attitude formation, treating human perceivers as essentially socially isolated. 
We will illustrate how the SCM can be used to generate predictions both about individu-
al, or agent learning, and the impact of social interaction. The outcome of these simula-
tions, and the values of key model parameters are subsequently further validated in a 
small group experiment with human participants.  
4.1	  Simulation	  1:	  Agent	  behavior	  
In typical group perception experiments, participants read a series of positive and nega-
tive behavioral statements about members of a fictional social group (Hamilton & 
Gifford, 1976; Van Rooy et al., 2003; Van Rooy et al., 2013), such as: “John, member of 
group A, helps an old lady across the street”, or “Peter, member of Group A, was caught 
littering”. After receiving a list of such statements, participants are then usually asked to 
report their attitudes towards the group.  
To illustrate the basic behavior of the agent model, we start with simulating a simpli-
fied version of this design involving one agent network, represented in Table 1 and Fig-
ure 3. The network contains a group node, representing the social group (“A”), and two 
valence nodes, representing positive (“+”) and negative (“-”) attributes of the group.  This 
is a so-called localist encoding scheme, in which each piece of information (or concept) 
is represented by a single node (for a similar approach, see Van Rooy et al., 2003; 2013). 
If |δ i |  <  Latitude
Two separate unitary valence nodes were taken, rather than a bipolar attribute node, as 
research shows that evaluations about groups are cognitively represented as mixed and 
complex constructs including both positive and negative instances of the attribute, rather 
than a single point on a one-dimensional construct (Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 2001). 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
An agent is trained by presenting it with a series of patterns in which the group unit is 
activated together with either the positive or negative valence unit. Table 1 shows a simu-
lated learning history: Each row represents a pattern of external activation at a trial that 
corresponds to a statement presented to a participant. Depending on the type of infor-
mation represented by a pattern, respective units are either turned on (activation level= 1) 
or turned off (activation level= 0). For instance, the first row {A+} could represent the 
statement “John, member of group A, helps an old lady across the street”.  The # indi-
cates the number of times each pattern of activation is presented. For instance, this Agent 
was trained on 9 {A+} and 4 {A-} patterns, which simulates a condition in an experiment 
in which a group of participants is presented with 9 positive and 4 negative statements 
about members of group A. 
 
Insert Figure 3: Learning histories for 5 agents (top left), resulting in dif-
ferent simulated attitudes towards “Group A”. The Figure shows the de-
velopment of the simulated attitudes in function of amount of learning. 
Figure 3 shows the learning process of a number of different agent networks. Their 
learning regime is indicated in the top left of the Figure – for instance, Agent 5 was 
trained on 9 {A+} and 4 {A-} patterns. A series of gradual, trial-by-trial adjustments by 
the learning algorithm, results in a certain configuration of connection weights in the 
network. This configuration determines how activation flows through the network and 
activates related concepts. To test the knowledge embedded in these connections, we 
apply a procedure analogous to when participants are cued with questions on the experi-
mental stimulus material learned previously.  More particularly, some concepts in the 
network serve as a cue to activate related material in the network. In this case, the group 
label served as a cue to estimate group attributes (positive or negative valence), by turn-
ing the activation of the cue on to +1. The difference between the final activation be-
tween the 2 attribute nodes is then taken as the agent’s attitude towards Group A. Figure 
3 shows how different learning histories result in different attitudes. 
Although a relatively simple set up, this agent model has been shown to be capable of 
simulating a number of key social psychological phenomena from group perception ( 
Smith & DeCoster, 1998; Van Rooy et al., 2003). This is due to a number of its learning 
properties, like it’s sensitivity to the ratio of positive to negative information, which is 
apparent from the figure above. In the next simulations, we will embed this agent model 
into an extended network and explore the ability of the model to simulate inter-personal 
processes.  
4.2	  Simulation	  2:	  Social	  interaction.	  
As mentioned, Social Comparison Theory deals with shared norm formation.  It argues 
that individuals develop socially shared knowledge through repeated social comparisons, 
during which privately held opinions are adapted and validated. In the following simula-
tion, we explored the group dynamics that emerge from the repeated application of the 
social comparison process implemented in our model (formula 8-9). More particularly, 
we simulated 10 agents, using the same agent network as in simulation 1. To simulate a 
certain degree of diversity, there are 3 different “cliques” of agents. Agents 1-5 received 
patterns that were strongly positive, agents 6-7 received neutral information (i.e. a mix of 
positive and negative patterns), and finally agents 8-10 received information containing 
mostly negative patterns.  Interaction step 1 in Figure 4 shows the resulting attitudes with 
which these agents start.   
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Subsequently, agents interact and exchange their impressions with all other agents. Inter-
action is simulated in a 2-step process. First, a target agent is made to express it’s opin-
ions about group A – similar to the training process in Simulation 1, the target agent is 
presented with stimuli (external activation) {A+} and {A-} in turn. For each such stimu-
lus, comparer agents receive external activation at their corresponding nodes ({A+} or 
{A-} respectively). Internal weights for comparer agents and external weights from target 
to comparer for {A+} or {A-} nodes as appropriate are updated, however target agents 
internal weights are not yet updated at this stage. At each interaction step in Figure 4, 
each agent interacted twice  (ie: twice {A+} and twice {A-}) with every other agent. 
Agent attitudes were measured after each step.  
 
The left panel in Figure 4 shows that, after a few interaction steps, agents start to self-
organize around a “majority” impression of the target group. This pattern further 
strengthens over the following interaction rounds, as the 3 agents with the “minority” 
impression of the group gradually shift towards the other agents that hold the “majority” 
impression (i.e. they assimilate). In fact, agents not only organize into a homogenous 
group, they reinforce each other’s information and end up with stronger attitudes towards 
the group than the ones with which they started. This corresponds to group polarization, 
whereby members of a group on average shift their opinion toward a more extreme posi-
tion during group discussion.  For this simulation, the latitude parameter was set to a val-
ue of .01. Increasing the value of this parameter leads to less polarization, and instead all 
agents in the group converge to the middle position (see right panel of Figure 4). This is 
line with the literature: Polarization, or a shift of the minority to a majority position, is 
more likely in a setting where individuals show little tolerance for deviance  (i.e. low 
latitude) (Isenberg, 1986). 
 
 
INSERT Figure 4: Development of attitudes towards Group A of 10 
agents in function of interaction steps. Latitude parameter set to .01. (left 
panel a) and 0.4 (right panel). At each step, each agent interacted twice 
with all other agents. 
 
This simulation illustrates an important group dynamic through which real social groups 
create, validate and maintain socially shared knowledge (Goethals & Darley, 1977; 
Turner, 1987):  Agents organize themselves around a shared norm or attitude, and with 
every interaction, the connection weights between them increase, reflecting increased 
social influence.  The gradually strengthening links between agents act as positive feed-
back loops that further reinforce attitudes. This produces the polarization effect, in which 
all agents end up with more extreme opinions after the interaction. However, it is obvious 
that groups of individuals not always assimilate, and group dynamics do not always pro-
duce polarization. When agents show no latitude whatsoever, opinions are obviously not 
adapted and remain as they are. Perhaps more interestingly, we can also explore the im-
pact of the amount of information exchange between the different “cliques” of agents.  
 
 
Figure 5: Development of attitudes towards Group A of 10 agents in func-
tion of amount of interaction. Within each clique, agents talk to each other 
three times, before talking to all other agents once.  Latitude is low (L= 
0.01). 
Figure 5 shows that if we reduce the exchange of information between the cliques, while 
increasing the communication within them, the amount of polarization and attitude 
change is greatly reduced. This is consistent with previous simulation work (Axelrod, 
1997) and the empirical literature (for an overview, see Isenberg, 1986) that shows that 
the amount of attitude change, and the willingness to adopt or conform to another point 
of view, is driven largely by the number of arguments that are exchanged between opin-
ion groups during interaction. Interestingly, and in line with Festingers’ theory, the dif-
ferent cliques self-organize around their shared attitude (“ingroups” versus “outgroups”), 
and maintain their social distance from each other.  
5.	  Small	  group	  experiment	  
As mentioned in the introduction, a number of factors have been identified that affect the 
amount of latitude individuals will display towards information from others. A good ex-
ample of this are norm manipulations that amplify the motivation among group members 
to deliberately and systematically process the information that becomes available during 
group discussion. For instance, Postmes and colleagues  (Postmes, Spears, & Cihangir, 
2001) conducted a number of studies in which they induced a “criticality” group norm in 
some groups, whereas other groups were encouraged to reach consensus.  Groups with a 
criticality norm took more consideration of unshared information and reached more high-
quality decisions. The same result has been found under a variety of experimental condi-
tions (Kelly & Karau, 1999; Scholten, van Knippenberg, Nijstad, & De Dreu, 2007). In 
our own work, we have demonstrated how a similar norm manipulation encouraged a 
group of software engineers to be more accepting of information coming from others in a 
critical compared to conformist mindset (Teh, Baniassad, Van Rooy, & Boughton, 2012). 
In sum, this work shows that, perhaps somewhat paradoxically, a critical mindset encour-
ages individuals to show more latitude towards the information coming from others, and 
to take information that might be inconsistent with their own views more into considera-
tion than a conformist mindset.  
We designed an experiment to specifically test whether the Latitude parameter can 
model the impact of norms on interpersonal processes. As mentioned, the Latitude pa-
rameter determines the discrepancy agents allow when comparing their information (see 
Formula 9). Based on the literature and our own research, our hypothesis is that low lati-
tude would correspond to a conformist mindset, where participants are not motivated to 
process information that might be inconsistent with their own. High latitude would then 
correspond to the critical norm condition, where participants are motivated to process 
information from other participants, even it conflicts with their own. 
5.1	  Design	  and	  procedure	  
Eighty psychology undergraduate students (32 men, 48 women; mean age = 21.3) partic-
ipated in the study.  Participants arrived in the lab and were informed that they would be 
receiving information about individuals who belonged to a particular social group, la-
beled “Group A”. They were asked to form an impression of this group, and told that 
they would afterwards be able to share their impressions with other participants.  
 
The procedure largely followed a standard group perception design (Hamilton & Gifford, 
1976; Van Rooy et al., 2013), in which participants receive information about a fictional 
social group. In Phase 1 of the experiment, individual participants were exposed to sen-
tences describing fictitious people engaging in various behaviors. Some of these behav-
iors were positive in nature (“J., member of group A, helped an old lady across the 
street.”), others negative (e.g., “refused to assist an old person who was lost”). These sen-
tences were developed as part of larger study (Van Rooy et al. 2013), and tested in a pilot 
study to make sure that they elicited similar levels of affective responding. Not all partic-
ipants received the same information. As Figure 6 shows, the majority of participants  
(“Majority”) received information indicating that the group was largely positive. A mi-
nority of participants (“Minority”) received information that portrayed the group in a 
more ambiguous light. Participants read this information individually and then indicated 
their impressions of the groups on a range of dependent measures.   
 
Figure 6: Experimental design of the small group study.   
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For the second phase of the experiment, participants were organized into groups of three 
and assigned to either a Critical or Conformist norm condition: Ten groups (30 partici-
pants) participated in the Critical norm condition, and 10 groups (30 participants) partici-
pated in the Conformist norm condition. Consistent with previous studies, participants in 
the Critical Norm condition were encouraged to carefully process and critically evaluate 
the information provided by other participants; in the Conformist Norm condition, partic-
ipants were encouraged to form a consensus (Postmes et al., 2001; Teh et al., 2012).  Im-
portantly, each group of three contained 2 majority and one minority participant. One of 
the key aims of the experiment was to discover how participants would combine their 
initial attitudes towards Group A, and particularly the impact the “minority view” would 
have. 
An experimenter led the group session. Each trial involved the experimenter reading 
out either positive or negative traits (e.g. “Good”, “Lazy”, “Intelligent”, …) and then 
asking each participant to indicate on a 11-point rating scale the degree to which they 
considered each statement to be representative of members of group A. Importantly, they 
were asked to voice their judgment by reading aloud the number they assigned (i.e. “Ten” 
to indicate it was very representative). The order in which participants answered was ran-
domized across trials. On finishing the study, participants were debriefed and thanked for 
their participation.   
5.2	  Model	  hypotheses	  
The basic idea behind this methodology was to encourage individuals to learn from the 
classification behavior of others. As in Sherifs’ studies, we created an experimental situa-
tion in which participants voice their judgments about the characteristics of an ambiguous 
phenomenon, in the hope that they would converge and that agreement would emerge 
from interpersonal interaction.  
 
Using the SCM, we can simulate the experiment and generate predictions, both about the 
initial attitudes with which participants start, and about the shared attitudes that develop 
over the course of the group phase. Figure 7 shows how agent networks adapt as they 
accumulate information on the co-occurrences of the target groups and their attributes, by 
changing the internal weights of the connections between the target group and its attrib-
utes. The model predicts that when Latitude is high (left panel), the three agents converge 
to a more neutral attitude towards Group A.  With lower latitude, there is less conver-
gence between majority and minority agents, and the shared attitude towards Group A is 
slightly more positive as compared to higher Latitude condition. Essentially, none of the 
agents are willing to adjust their attitude quite as much, and the majority position remains 
more positive. This results in a more positive shared attitude. 
 
INSERT Figure 7: Simulated attitude towards Group A for 2 majority and 
one minority agent in the High Latitude (left panel, L=.5) and Low Lati-
tude simulation (Right panel, L= 0.1).  Each step on the X-axis corre-
sponds to one interaction.  
So essentially, the model predicts that in the Critical condition (high latitude), partici-
pants will be more likely to adjust their attitudes and converge on a more neutral attitude, 
which incorporates both majority and minority positions. In the Conformist condition 
(low latitude), participants will adjust their attitudes less, the majority will remain more 
positive, and the shared attitudes will reflect this.   
5.3	  Results	  
As mentioned, only a few studies have investigated the actual development of shared 
attitudes within small groups. This is partly due to the failure of existing theories and 
models to provide clear predictions of how individual cognitions and group dynamics 
will interact and shape each other. As Figure 7 shows, the SCM overcomes this limitation 
and makes a number of particular predictions regarding the development of attitudes to-
wards the target group.  First, the model predicts that, regardless of the norm (or Lati-
tude), participants will converge to a more neutral attitude as the experiment progresses. 
Second, the model predicts that this convergence will proceed faster in the Critical condi-
tion, compared to the Conformist  condition. A first look at Figure 8 suggests that these 
predictions have both been confirmed.  
 To monitor their development over time, attitudes towards the target were aver-
aged across the 3 participants for each group, and this after each block of 2 positive and 2 
negative adjectives. This corresponds to a step in Figure 8. To test the first hypothesis, a 
difference score was calculated between Majority and Minority attitudes at step 1 and 
step 10. Across the two Norm conditions, this difference was significantly smaller at Step 
10 (M= 0.455) compared to step 1 (M= 1.35), t(1, 9)= 6.71, p< 0.05), clearly confirming 
the first hypothesis. The model also predicted that this convergence effect would be more 
outspoken in the Critical (corresponding to High Latitude) compared to the Conformist 
(Low Latitude) condition, which was also supported by the data: The difference between 
Majority and Minority attitude at step 10 was larger in the Conformist (M=.85) compared 
to the Critical condition (M=.06), t(1, 9)= 6.71, p< 0.05. 
  
Figure 8: Average attitudes towards Group A for majority and minority 
participants in the Conformist (Low latitude) and Critical (High Latitude) 
conditions.  Each step on the X-axis corresponds to a block of 4 trials (i.e. 
2 positive and negative traits).  
 
Both of these results confirm model predictions that in the Critical condition (high Lati-
tude), participants would be more likely to adjust their attitudes and converge on a more 
neutral attitude, incorporating both majority and minority positions. Figure 8 shows that 
in the Critical condition (Left panel), the majority (slope gradient, or b1= -.052) and mi-
nority (b1= .058) moved closer to each other, developing a more neutral attitude towards 
Group A. In the Conformist condition (Right panel), both majority (b1= -.022) and minor-
ity (b1= .031) participants moved closer at a slower speed, and were more inclined to 
maintain their initial attitude position as compared to the critical condition. This is con-
firmed by a statistical comparison: Although the Majority Attitude became more neutral 
in both conditions, it did so significantly faster in the Critical condition (b1= -.052) com-
pared to the Conformist condition (b1= -.022), t=2.97, p < .01. Similarly, the Minority 
Attitude became more neutral significantly faster in the Critical condition (b1= .058) 
compared to the Conformist condition (b1= .031), t=-2.613, p < .02. In all, the predictions 
generated by the model regarding how individual cognition (i.e. the development of atti-
tudes) and social influence (the impact of the norm manipulation) would shape each other 
were very much confirmed.     
 
5.4	  Discussion	  
In our experiment, participants were provided with information about individuals belong-
ing to a fictional social group (labeled “Group A”) and were asked to form an impression 
of this group. They were told that they would be able to share their impressions with oth-
er participants afterwards in groups of 3. Half of these groups were  encouraged to care-
fully process and critically evaluate the information provided by other 
pants  (“Critical norm”), the other half was encouraged to form a consensus ("Conformist 
Norm") (see Postmes et al., 2001; Teh et al., 2012). At the start of the group phase, each 
group had one participant with a "minority” attitude and two participants with a “majori-
ty” attitude towards  Group A. One of the key aims of the experiment was to test SCM 
predictions on how participants would combine these initial attitudes, and particularly the 
impact the “minority view” would have on the emerging shared attitude or stereotype. 
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Overall, there was strong support for SCM predictions: Participants converged to a more 
neutral attitude as the experiment progresses, and this regardless of the norm condition. 
In addition, this convergence proceeded faster in the Critical  compared to the Conform-
ist  condition. And as predicted by the SCM, this was due to the fact that participants in 
the Critical condition were more likely to incorporate both majority and minority posi-
tions, giving rise to a more neutral shared attitude towards Group A . 
    These results provide further support for the notion that social comparison processes 
play an important role in the formation and maintenance of stereotypes.  Previous studies 
had shown that individuals use the degree of consensus within a group as a measure of 
subjective validity of their opinions (Festinger, 1954; Sherif, 1935; Turner, 1987) and 
stereotypical representations of a target group (Haslam, Oakes, Reynolds, & Turner, 
1999).  Our study  extends this research by providing a more detailed insight into the 
underlying socio-cognitive process, and how it interacts with norms. As such, the combi-
nation of simulations and empirical data provides a detailed process model of the core 
social comparison processes through which  stereotypes and attitudes appear to be social-
ly validated within groups of individuals. 
 
The direct application of a connectionist ABM to small group experiments is unusual 
within ABM literature. ABM are typically applied to large, complex systems (i.e. the 
emergence of cooperation and norms within cultures and economies) and agent behavior 
within such simulations is mostly governed by simple if-then rules. However, a number 
of authors have pointed out that these simple if-then rules often result in agent behavior 
that is psychologically implausible, and as a result they do not necessarily produce mean-
ingful insight into real human interaction (Sallach, 2003; Sun, Coward & Zenzen, 2005). 
The recurrent connectionist network provides a psychologically plausible, but still rela-
tively simple agent model. In addition, any agent in the SCM can in principle interact 
with any other agent, and  the impact of the interaction will adapt to experience. This is 
different from previous ABM such as cellular automata, where agents interact in their 
geometric neighborhood; or social network models, where the strength of the social rela-
tions does not change as a function of agent experience. Our model incorporates an adap-
tive agent within an adaptive network structure, which allows studying the co-evolution 
of individual cognition and social relations. From a social-psychological perspective, this 
is an important step in developing better models of individual and social cognition. 
However, we also argue that such improvements to simulation models alone do 
not guarantee meaningful insights into individual and social psychological processes. To 
achieve this, we suggest a tight coupling between simulations and experimental studies, 
in which iterative loops of simulations and experiments inform psychologically plausible 
ranges of novel model parameters. This can provide an impetus to experimental research 
investigating the development of shared attitudes within real, interacting groups of partic-
ipants. As mentioned, there is a lack of theoretically driven research in this area, due to 
the complexity that arises from the interactions between even small groups of individuals, 
and the fluid nature of attitudes. The use of a model such as the SCM can alleviate these 
problems, and allows making precise predictions of how individual and interpersonal 
processes will interact to shape the development of shared attitudes. 
 
The simulations and experiment demonstrate the impact that the level of Latitude can 
have on group dynamics, and the attitudes that emerge from it. Even small variations in 
Latitude settings can apparently have significant consequences on the development of 
attitudes. Variations in other parameters, such as agent learning rate or social learning 
rate, do not have similar impacts on group dynamics.  The results from this experiment, 
and the accompanying simulations, suggest that reduced Latitude results in less adoption 
of a majority position, and to more divergent opinions. As such, it appears to mimic the 
impact of reduced communication between cliques (Figure 5). The SCM thus suggests at 
least two factors that influence the critical group dynamics underlying these results: (1) 
the amount of communication across cliques, or opinion groups and (b) the amount of 
agent latitude. This issue, and the way that communication and latitude interact, can be 
further explored both by more fine-grained experimental set-ups, but also through further 
simulations, using larger simulated collectives. This will allow us to explore under which 
precise lab-conditions different cliques show assimilation or contrast, and also how these 
conditions hold up in larger collectives, using more cliques and more differentiated be-
liefs. This will give us different views on the important issue of why, and how, different 
cultures, or subcultures, sometimes assimilate, and other times seek further contrast, lead-
ing to more polarization and potentially undesirable societal tension and conflict.  
6.	   Conclusion	  
The simulations show that the SCM can potentially model the impact of a variety of psy-
chological determinants of Latitude. This has a number of advantages: Psychological 
theories are often built around verbal axioms that do not lend themselves well to algo-
rithmic implementation. The SCM provides an account in terms of simple, but powerful 
algorithms that mimic real memory processes, and allows exploring macro level-
consequences of the repeated application of these processes, in parallel by many agents, 
within an artificial social system.  Such an integrated framework will allow investigating 
the impact of psychological latitude determinants, ranging from the extremity of the 
standard (Herr, Sherman, & Fazio, 1983; Herr, 1986), the ambiguity of the target (Herr et 
al., 1983), or category membership (Mussweiler, 2003), in an unprecedented way.  
This approach can also help develop the existing empirical literature in novel di-
rections. For instance, the empirical approach in this paper was very much inspired by 
social psychological research into how interpersonal communication verifies stereotypes 
(Festinger, 1954; Sherif, 1935; Turner, 1987). However, it is obvious that there are condi-
tions under which stereotypes will not be accepted by members of a social group. Sur-
prisingly, this topic has received relatively little attention in social psychological re-
search, but there are a number of simulation models that have explored it. For instance, 
Huet, Deffuant & Jager (2008) demonstrated the impact of multi-dimensional attitudes on 
the development of conformity, using a model very similar to the SCM: Both models are 
built around a rejection mechanism determined by a tolerance parameter. The experi-
mental design introduced in this paper could be adapted, for instance by providing infor-
mation to participants that is inherently contradictory (i.e., Group A is both aggressive 
and peaceful). This would allow testing the predictions of the SCM, and to formally 
compare it with other simulations.  
 
The SCM can promote theoretical integration, by examining the impact of a variety of 
psychological determinants of Latitude, which have often been studied in different fields 
of research. In addition, the model can also generate novel and testable predictions, and 
as such support a process of probing and prediction.  In this process, simulations provide 
guidance for empirical research as well as sufficient depth to support interactive modifi-
cation of the underlying theory.  Using a computational model, we can create large sets of 
simulated social groups, each set having its own characteristics, which can then be put 
into a wide range of conditions. This represents a very efficient way of testing theoretical 
predictions in simulated collectives. 
 
By creating a community of networks, new parameters appear that are not present when 
we only consider an individual network. It is the nature of these community parameters, 
and the nature of their relationship with features of real social groups, that are the focus 
of our empirical program.  Small group studies, like the one described above, allow us to 
validate and inform the most psychologically plausible values of these parameters. Alt-
hough space limitations prevented us from elaborating on this in detail, we also explored 
the robustness of the reported simulations by using different parameter ranges and varia-
tions on the architecture, including an exhaustive search of the novel community parame-
ters. This did not alter the basic simulated patterns in a significant way.  Similarly, using 
a distributed representation rather than a localist representation (i.e. each concept is rep-
resented by a pattern of activation across a set of micro-units) does not alter the funda-
mental simulated patterns.  
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The SCM shares similarities with other simulation work that integrates assimilative and 
contrastive social influence (Hegselmann & Krause, 2002; Van Overwalle & Heylighen, 
2006). For instance, so-called “seceder” models postulate that people seek distinctiveness 
when in the company of others. In these models, individuals are assigned particular atti-
tude positions on a continuous scale, and then look at randomly chosen others to select 
the one whose attitude is the most different from the mean attitude within a particular 
comparison group. Although there are distinct architectural differences, many of these 
models are very consistent with each other, as they all predict that individuals will only 
move to the position of a deviant, nonconforming position when in the company of at 
least a few similar others (i.e. as part of a clique). As such they combine an assimilative 
process, i.e. moving toward a chosen individual, with a contrastive process, moving to-
ward the extreme and away from the mean. Although formal simulations are needed, it is 
likely that the predictions of these models of how groups can end up converging to a 
common opinion or split into several subgroups holding differing opinions, depending on 
the initial attitude distribution and the threshold for influence from others, are very simi-
lar.   
 
In this paper, we tried to illustrate how a computational model, build around a valid, so-
cial psychological theory of agent heuristics can contribute to a better understanding of 
social complex phenomena.  We introduced an agent-based implementation of Festing-
ers’ Social Comparison Theory (SCT), consisting of connectionist networks that simulate 
agent-level social comparison processes. By creating an extended network, or a “commu-
nity of networks”, these agents can exchange information with each other.  In comparison 
to other ABM, the current model allows investigating individual and social adaptive be-
havior in more detail.  The model generates predictions regarding how individual cogni-
tion (i.e. the development of attitudes) and social influence shape each other that can be 
tested in empirical studies. At the same time, simulation 2 (Figures 4 and 5) illustrates 
that the model can be “scaled up” to simulate group dynamics involving larger number of 
agents. Although beyond the scope of the current article, it shows that the current model 
can also be applied to larger, societal phenomena.  
 
By directly applying simulations to a classic small group experiment, we aimed to illus-
trate how the SCM generates behavior consistent with a number of core group dynamical 
processes, and how it can also be used to generate precise hypotheses that can be empiri-
cally tested. Through an iterative process of prediction, testing and model building, the 
architecture and its parameters can be further empirically validated. Such an integrated 
framework will allow investigating some of the key theoretical predictions around the 
origin and maintenance of socially shared information through social comparisons, in  
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 Agent Network: 
Frequency: A + - 
#9 {A+} 1 1 0 
#4{A-} 1 0 1 
Table 1: Agent network and learning history of 1 agent in a simulation of a group perception experiment. A 
value of “+1” indicates the unit is activated, while “0” means inactive. Network: A= Group label, += positive 
attribute, -= Negative attribute. 
  























Figure 3: Learning histories for 5 agents (top left), resulting in different simulated attitudes towards “Group A”. 
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Figure 4: Development of attitudes towards Group A of 10 agents in function of interaction steps. Latitude 








































Figure 5: Development of attitudes towards Group A of 10 agents in function of amount of interaction. Within 
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Figure 7: Simulated attitude towards Group A for 2 majority and one minority agent in the High Latitude (left 
panel, L=.5) and Low Latitude simulation (Right panel, L= 0.1).  Each step on the X-axis corresponds to 
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Figure 8: Average attitudes towards Group A for majority and minority agents in the Conformist (Low latitude) 
and Critical (High Latitude) conditions.  Each step on the X-axis corresponds to a block of 4 trials (i.e. 2 posi-
tive and negative traits).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
